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WEBSITES AS "PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION":
AMENDING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN
THE WAKE OF NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND V.
TARGET CORPORATION
Isabel Arana DuPree'
The question of whether Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act does or should apply to websites has been an issue
of public interest since the advent of the Internet. In National
Federation of the Blind v. Target Corporation, the Ninth Circuit
was the first to find that Title III did apply to a website. Although
Target was based on a specific set offacts, the decision highlights
the need for Congress to amend the Act to address websites. This
Recent Development explains why it is appropriate for Congress to
take action now and examines several possible approaches
Congress could take in amending the Act to address its application
to websites.
I. INTRODUCTION
In National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corporation,2
Bruce Sexton,' a blind individual, filed suit against Target
Corporation ("Target") for discriminating against disabled
persons.' In their complaint, the plaintiffs asserted that because
Target's website, Target.com, was inaccessible to the blind, the
defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).'
Target filed a motion to dismiss stating the plaintiffs' claim was
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008. Special
thanks to Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law Laura
Gasaway, Clinical Assistant Professor Amy Flanary-Smith, Mike Anderson,
and Brad DuPree for their comments and suggestions.
2 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Mr. Sexton was joined by the National Federation of the Blind and the
National Federation of the Blind of California in this lawsuit.
4 Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp. (Target), 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949
(N.D. Cal. 2006).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006); 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (2006).
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not actionable because Target.com was not a "place of public
accommodation" recognized by Title III of the ADA' (Title III).
Ultimately, the court found the plaintiffs' claim viable because
Target.com had a nexus to Target stores, which are places of
public accommodation.'
Target highlights the need for Congress to reexamine whether
websites are potential places of public accommodation,' and to
amend the Act to address the websites to which Title III should
apply. In Target, the Ninth Circuit became the first to allow an
inaccessibility claim to proceed against a business website under
Title 111.10 While the holding in Target was highly fact specific,
the decision could have serious implications for websites or other
remote access accommodations not explicitly addressed in the
"public accommodation"" language of Title III. By amending
Title III, Congress will proactively address which websites are
subject to Title III. Thus, Congress should reexamine the
definition of a public accommodation in the ADA and either
include a clearly defined set of websites or explicitly exclude
websites altogether.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2006).
7 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
8 Id. at 955 ("Defendant's argument is unpersuasive and the court declines to
dismiss the action for failure to allege a denial of physical access to the Target
stores.").
9 Although Congress examined this issue in 2000, because of the number of
published decisions in the past few years specifically addressing the issue of
websites and the ADA, it seems appropriate to reexamine the issue again. See
infra Section IV. See also Charles D. Mockbee IV, Caught in the Web of the
Internet: The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Online
Businesses, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 553, 571 (2004).
10 CARLA J. ROZYCKI & DARREN M. MUNGERSON, AM. SOCIETY OF Ass'N
EXECUTIVES, NATIONAL FEDERATION FOR THE BLIND V. TARGET CORP.: ITS
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON WEB SITES AND SERVICES (Nov. 2006), https://shop.
asaenet.org/news/AL%26PNov6.htm ("The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California's ... opinion in [Target] is the first published
decision allowing a claim of inaccessibility of a website to proceed against a
private entity under Title III of the ADA.") (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
" 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
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This Recent Development examines the need for Congress to
revisit Title III to add websites as public accommodations. Part II
examines the background of the ADA, including a detailed view of
the language of Title III. Part III provides a review of three recent
opinions that were most influential on the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Target, and how the court reconciled these opinions to reach the
Target decision. Part IV addresses Target's implications and the
questions raised by the lack of a clear rule following Target.
Part V concludes with an examination of why Congress should
amend the language of Title III to address websites, how Congress
could proceed, and whether narrow or broad language addressing
websites would better serve the purpose and administration of
Title III.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act
People affected by disabilities most often rely on other people,
businesses, and governments to make daily activities such as
crossing the street, reading a menu, or using an automated teller
machine ("ATM") less burdensome. Seventeen years ago,
Congress passed the ADA in an effort to eliminate discriminatory
barriers for the disabled in everyday living.12 In the ADA,
Congress noted that millions of Americans suffer from
discrimination on the basis of their mental or physical disabilities.13
Furthermore, the discrimination faced by this substantial minority
of Americans impacts all aspects of their lives, including
employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting, and access to public services.14 By
enacting the ADA, Congress intended to provide enforceable
standards to address discrimination against the disabled in these
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006). The Act invoked Federal authority to
enforce the standards outlined in the ADA against private entities and states
through the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12 10 1(b)(4).
1 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2006).
I4 id.
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areas, and to vest the enforcement role in the Federal
Government.'
B. Title III and "Place ofPublic Accommodation"
Title III addresses discrimination in the context of public
accommodations.16 It prohibits a place of public accommodation
from denying disabled persons the "full and equal enjoyment" of
that public accommodation." Title III is different from other anti-
discrimination statutes because it requires places of public
accommodation to take affirmative action to prevent
discrimination against the disabled."
The statute identifies four contexts in which discrimination by
a place of public accommodation could exist. 9 First,
discrimination will occur when an accommodation imposes
eligibility criteria which either "screen out or tend to screen out"
" 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)-(3).
16 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2006).
" 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation."). Title III explicitly defines a "public
accommodation" to include: (1) hotels and other similar places of lodging,
(2) restaurants and other places serving food or drink, (3) movie theaters or other
places of entertainment, (4) auditoriums, convention centers, or lecture halls,
(5) grocery stores, shopping centers, and other sales establishments,
(6) laundromats, banks, professional offices, or other service establishments,
(7) any station used for specified public transportation, (8) museums, libraries,
or other places of public display, (9) zoos and places of recreation, (10) places of
education, (11) social services establishments, and (12) places of exercise or
recreation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). For purposes of Title III and this Recent
Development, the phrases "accommodation," "public accommodation," and
"place of public accommodation" are used interchangeably to refer to the
accommodations defined within the statute.
18 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 104 (1990)); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)iv) (2006)
("The ADA thus departs from certain anti-discrimination statutes in requiring
that places of public accommodation take affirmative steps to accommodate the
disabled.").
'
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A).
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disabled people from equal enjoyment of the accommodation.20
For example, requiring someone to be able to walk as a
prerequisite for being a contestant on a television game show
would be discrimination under Title III." Such eligibility criteria
are allowed only to the extent they are necessary for the provision
of goods or services being offered by the public accommodation.22
It is not necessary that contestants be ambulatory for a game show
to provide the services it offers to the public.
Second, discrimination under Title III occurs if a public
accommodation fails to make reasonable modifications to its
policies or procedures in order to make its services or goods
available to the disabled.23  However, modifications that would
alter the nature of the services or goods offered by the
accommodation are not required.2 4 In other words, a bookstore
may be required to make its facilities handicapped accessible, but
it would not be required to start selling books printed in Braille
because such a modification alters "the nature or mix of goods"
being offered by the book store.25
20 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (imposing "eligibility criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out an individual ... or any class of individuals with
disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations").
21 See, e.g., Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.
2002) (stating that the screening out of otherwise qualified persons on the basis
of a disability would violate the ADA).
22 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (disallowing eligibility criteria
"unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations").
23 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
24 Id. (stating reasonable modifications are necessary "unless the entity can
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter such
nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations" of the entity).
25 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public
Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,571
(July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36). The Department of Justice stated:
The purpose of the ADA's public accommodations requirements is to
ensure accessibility to the goods offered by a public accommodation,
not to alter the nature or mix of goods that the public accommodation
has typically provided. In other words, a bookstore, for example, must
277
N.C. J. L. & TECH.
Third, discrimination includes failure of a public
accommodation to take necessary steps to ensure disabled persons
are not denied services or segregated because there are no auxiliary
aids or services available at the accommodation.26 Providing
auxiliary aids or services is not necessary when such a provision
would fundamentally alter the goods or services of the
accommodation, or would result in an undue burden.2 7 However,
the auxiliary aid or services requirement is most concerned with
ensuring the public accommodation communicates effectively with
customers. 28 For example, if a restaurant server is available to read
the menu to blind patrons, failing to provide a menu printed in
Braille is not discrimination under Title 111.29
Finally, discrimination includes a public accommodation's
failure to remove structural barriers when removal is possible.3 0
Removal of barriers may require any number of actions, including
installation of a ramp, rearranging tables or chairs, or repositioning
telephones." For example, existing and new banks would be
make its facilities and sales operations accessible to individuals with
disabilities, but is not required to stock Brailled or large print books.
Id.
26 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
27 Id. (stating the provision of auxiliary aids and services is required "unless
the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the
nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation
being offered or would result in an undue burden").
28 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,566 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36)
("The auxiliary aid requirement is a flexible one. A public accommodation can
choose among various alternatives as long as the result is effective
communication.").
29 Id. As noted by the Department of Justice:
[A] restaurant would not be required to provide menus in Braille for
patrons who are blind, if the waiters in the restaurant are made
available to read the menu. Similarly, a clothing boutique would not
be required to have Brailled price tags if sales personnel provide price
information orally upon request; and a bookstore would not be required
to make available a sign language interpreter, because effective
communication can be conducted by notepad.
Id
3o 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
31 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) (2000). Additional examples of actions which
may be required to remove barriers include: making curb cuts in sidewalks and
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required to adjust the height of ATMs to make them accessible to
people in wheelchairs.32 However, an existing bank's need to
remove barriers will be assessed in light of the expense associated
with such an alteration, while new banks would have to make
ATMs "readily accessible to and usable by persons with
disabilities."
In addition to defining what constitutes discrimination by a
public accommodation, Title III also lists twelve general
categories34 qualifying as public accommodations for purposes of
the statute, to the extent that their operations "affect commerce."3
The categories include a variety of brick and mortar structures
ranging from hotels and stores to schools and fitness centers.
However, Title III does not expressly include websites as places of
public accommodation.
entrances, repositioning shelves, adding raised markings on elevator control
buttons, installing flashing alarm lights, widening doors, installing offset hinges
to widen doorways, eliminating a turnstile or providing an alternative accessible
path, installing accessible door hardware, installing grab bars in toilet stalls, or
rearranging toilet partitions to increase maneuvering space. Id.
32 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,568.
33 Id. (internal quotes omitted).
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
3 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
36 id.
37 It should be noted that Congress has amended other Federal statutes to
apply to websites and other forms of information technology. See, e.g., The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794d), as amended by the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998 (Aug. 7, 1998). The amended Rehabilitation Act
requires Federal departments and agencies to make their "electronic and
information technology" accessible to "individuals with disabilities who are
members of the public seeking information or services from a Federal
department or agency." 29 U.S.C. § 794d(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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III. INTERPRETATIONS OF "PLACE OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION"
Three cases38 were instrumental to the Target court's holding
that Target.com was subject to Title III in certain contexts. 39 These
cases, when combined with Target, illustrate a split among circuits
in the interpretation and application of the place of public
accommodation standard.
A. Pre-Target Decisions
1. Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc.
In Stoutenborough, a group of hearing impaired individuals
sued the National Football League (NFL) claiming "the [NFL's]
'blackout rule,' which [prohibited] the live local broadcast of home
football games .. . before game-time, [violated] the [ADA]."40 The
plaintiffs stated the blackout rule discriminated against them "in a
disproportionate way because they [had] no other means of
accessing the football game[s] 'via telecommunication
technology."'"1 For this reason, the plaintiffs claimed they were
being denied the "substantially equal" access the ADA required.42
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued the services provided through
the television broadcast were offered as "services, benefits, or
privileges in places of public accommodation."43
38 See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312
(S.D. Fla. 2002), appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004); Rendon v.
Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002); Stoutenborough v. Nat'l
Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
39 See Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
[T]o the extent ... Target.com impedes the full and equal enjoyment of
goods and services offered in Target stores, the plaintiffs state a
[Title III] claim . . . . To the extent that Target.com offers information
and services unconnected to Target stores, which do not affect the
enjoyment of goods and services offered in Target stores, the plaintiffs
fail to state a claim under Title III of the ADA.
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The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
for relief, and granted the NFL's motion to dismiss." Persuaded
by the defendants'45 argument, the court held the blackout rule was
not discriminatory because "it [applied] equally to both the hearing
and hearing-impaired."4 6 Since all viewers were prevented from
watching a blackout game, the plaintiffs did not have a viable
discrimination claim.47
Significantly, the Sixth Circuit found none of the defendants
were entities to which Title III applied.48 Moreover, the plaintiffs
sought a service, a televised broadcast, which in no way involved a
place of public accommodation.49 The game the plaintiffs wanted
to view was played in a place of public accommodation;"o
however, the challenged service (i.e., the television broadcast) was
not provided by the place of public accommodation. Therefore,
Title III did not apply."
44 Id. at 584.
45 The Cleveland Browns, a number of broadcasting companies, and several
television stations were also defendants in this suit.
46 Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 582 (6th Cir.
1995) (emphasis added).
47 Id. The court also adopted the defendants' argument that it was irrelevant
whether a blacked out game was broadcast via radio (i.e., giving the hearing
another option to a televised broadcast), stating: "[T]he [blackout] rule ...
impacts only the televised broadcast of home football games." Id. In addition,
the court noted that "the advent of devices that make radio transmission
accessible to persons with hearing impairments, [make it possible] for the
hearing and the hearing-impaired populations [to] attain equal footing as the
radio broadcasts become available to both." Id.
48 Id at 583 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994)) ("[N]one of the defendants
falls within any of the twelve 'public accommodation' categories identified in
the [ADA].").
49 Id. ("[T]he 'service' ... does not involve a 'place of public
accommodation."').
5o Here, the football stadium where the Cleveland Browns played.
51 Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.
1995). None of the parties the plaintiffs filed suit against fell within the
definition of a "place of public accommodation." See id. Although the football
game was played in a stadium, which would be a place of public
accommodation, it was the restrictions on the broadcast which the plaintiffs
challenged. Thus, because the entities offering (or not offering) the broadcast
were not denying equal access to a place of public accommodation, the
281
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2. Rendon and Access Now, Inc.
In Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd.,52 a group of hearing
and mobility impaired plaintiffs brought suit against Valleycrest
Productions Limited and American Broadcasting Company (ABC).
The Rendon plaintiffs, who were either hearing impaired or
suffered from a condition that limited their finger mobility,
claimed the defendants' telephone selection process for "Who
Wants to be a Millionaire" ("Millionaire") violated Title III
because it tended to screen out disabled people." Specifically, the
selection process required potential contestants to call a toll-free
telephone number and use a telephone keypad to answer a series of
pre-recorded questions.5 4
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint because
the telephone selection process was "not conducted at a physical
location."" For this reason, the selection process was not a place
of public accommodation covered by Title III.6 Therefore, the
issue on appeal in Rendon was whether Title III could be applied to
a process preventing the disabled from participating in
competitions held in a public accommodation.
On appeal, the Rendon defendants asserted the screening
hotline was not a public accommodation or a "physical barrier to
entry erected at a public accommodation."s Furthermore, the
hotline did not prevent the plaintiffs from gaining access to the
public accommodation-the studio where the show was recorded.59
plaintiffs' case failed to state a claim as it related to both the NFL and the
broadcasting companies. See id.
52 294 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002).
" Id. at 1281.
54 Id. at 1280-81.
" Id. at 1281.
56 d
7Id. at 1282.
58 Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added).
59 id.
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The defendants argued that, because the screening process posed
no physical barrier, it could not be subject to a Title III claim.60
The court of appeals rejected the defendants' argument,"
holding that Title III also applies to "intangible barriers," which
include discriminatory procedures that restrict a disabled person's
"ability to enjoy the defendant entity's goods, services and
privileges."6 2 Pointing to decisions from other circuits,6 3 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the telephone selection process used by
the defendants was an intangible barrier" depriving the plaintiffs
of the "opportunity to compete for the privilege of being a
contestant on Millionaire,"" which occurred at a place of public
accommodation.6 6  The telephone screening process was an
intangible barrier to a privilege offered by a place of public
accommodation; thus, the process was subject to Title III.67
Access Now v. Southwest Airlines, Co. was the first judicial
opinion that addressed Title III in the context of business
60 Id. The defendants also attempted to use Stoutenborough to assert that the
ADA should not apply to television broadcasts because they are not a service
"operate[d] from a 'place' of 'public accommodation."' See id. at 1284 (quoting
Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583). The court rejected this argument stating the
Rendon plaintiffs did not bring suit to view a show. Id. Instead, the plaintiffs
wanted the privilege of competing on a show in a place of public
accommodation. See id.
61 See id. at 1283-84.
62 Id. at 1283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000)) (emphasis
added).
63 See id. at 1285 (citing Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir.
1998); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 226 F.3d 69 (2nd Cir. 2000))
(arising under the ADA where discrimination occurred "at a distance").
6 Examples include discriminatory screening mechanism, policy or
procedure.
65 Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). In
reaching this decision, the court rejected the defendants' implied assertion that
"so long as discrimination occurs off site, it does not offend Title III." Id. at
1285. The court noted that reading Title III to allow offsite discrimination
would be "misreading the relevant statutory language" and "contradicting
numerous judicial opinions dealing with discrimination perpetrated 'at a
distance."' Id.
661d. at 1283.67Id. at 1286.
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websites.6 8 The plaintiffs, Access Now, Inc., a non-profit access
advocacy organization for disabled individuals, and a blind
individual named Robert Gumson, filed suit against Southwest
Airlines ("Southwest") for violation of Title III on the grounds that
the company's website, southwest.com, made its "virtual ticket
counters" inaccessible to blind people."9 The plaintiffs noted that
assistive technology, which can aid blind people in navigating the
Internet, is readily available through various types of computer
software."o The effectiveness of an assistive technology requires
that a website be programmed to interact with the technology,7 1 but
southwest.com and Southwest's virtual ticket counters were not
programmed to be accessible to blind people who rely on assistive
technologies. 72 The plaintiffs claimed the denial of access deprived
the blind of equal access to the airline's virtual ticket counters,
which they argued were places of public accommodation.7 3
The Access Now court cited two reasons for dismissing the
plaintiffs' complaint. First, southwest.com74 was not a place of
public accommodation under Title III.' The court pointed to the
twelve listed categories of public accommodation in Title III,6
stating that the congressional intent was for the statute to apply
68 See Michael Goldfarb, Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co.-Using
the "Nexus" Approach to Determine Whether a Website Should be Governed by
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1313, 1319 (2005).
69Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314
(S.D. Fla. 2002).
70 Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs noted assistive technologies currently made
available to the creators of websites by a number of computer software
companies include: voice-dictation software, voice-navigation software, and
magnification software. Id. The assistive technologies help "visually impaired
persons in navigating through varying degrees of text and graphics found on
different websites." Id. In addition, the plaintiffs noted that over 15% of the
visually impaired people in the United States use the Internet. Id.
71 See id. at 1314-15.
72 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
"Id. at 1315.
74 Reference to southwest.com includes the website's "virtual ticket counters,"
in dispute in Access Now.
7 Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314
(S.D. Fla. 2002).
7Id. at 1317 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000)).
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only to "access to physical, concrete places of public
accommodation."" Second, there was no nexus between
southwest.com and a place of public accommodation.7 ' Because
southwest.com and the virtual ticket counters were not "in any
particular geographic location," the plaintiffs could not prove a
nexus between a challenged service and "a specific, physical,
concrete space." 79  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the
telephone screening process in Access from Rendon because
southwest.com was not a physical space under Title III."
7 Id. at 1318-19 (emphasis added) ("[T]his [c]ourt cannot properly construe
'a place of public accommodation' to include Southwest's Internet website,
southwest. com").
78 Id. at 1321. Title III explicitly excludes commercial aircraft from the
definition of a public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10) (2006). Air
travel was excluded because it was protected under a different statute, the Air
Carrier Access Act of 1986. See National Council on Disability, When the
Americans with Disabilities Act Goes Online: Application of the ADA to the
Internet and the Worldwide Web (July 10, 2003), http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroom/publications/2003/adaintemet.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); see also H.R. Rep. 101-485, Part II at 87,
1990 WL 125563.
7 Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321
(S.D. Fla. 2002) (indicating that, if the plaintiffs had shown the website impeded
access to an actual airline ticket counter or travel agency, then there might have
been a nexus).
80 Id. at 1320-21 ("[T]he Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have both
recognized that the Internet is 'a unique medium-known to its users as
'cyberspace'-located in no particular geographic location but available to
anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet."') (citations
omitted).
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B. Target and the Ninth Circuit
In the Target case, Bruce Sexton, a blind man, filed suit against
Target for discrimination in violation of federal and state laws."' In
their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that because Target's
website, Target.com, was inaccessible to the blind, they were
"denied full and equal access to Target stores" in violation of
Title 111.82
The Ninth Circuit denied Target's motion to dismiss based on
the company's interpretations of Rendon, Access Now, and
Stoutenborough. In its motion, Target first argued that the ADA
requires actionable discrimination to occur on the premises of the
public accommodation ("on-site")." Second, Target argued the
discrimination must have the effect of denying physical entry to
the public accommodation.84
In response, the Ninth Circuit first noted that Title III prohibits
disability-based discrimination "'in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, . . . or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation.""' The defendant's interpretation of the statute,
requiring discrimination to occur on-site or in a place of public
accommodation, "contradict[ed] the plain meaning of the
statute."86 For this reason, the Ninth Circuit held discrimination
need not occur on-site for the plaintiffs' claim to be viable."
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that actionable discrimination
under Title III is not limited to denial of physical access to public
accommodations." Title III encompasses more than "mere
8 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2006). This Recent
Development will only examine the plaintiffs' claims for violation of federal
law.
82 Id. at 949-50.
8 Id. at 953.
84 Id. (stating that the defendant's contention was that precedent "stand[s] for
the proposition that the ADA prohibits only discrimination occurring on the
premises of a place of public accommodation, that 'discrimination' is limited to
denial of physical entry to, or use of, a space").
85 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000)) (emphasis in original).86 id.
87 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
88 Id.
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physical access," reaching "actions or omissions which impair a
disabled person's 'full enjoyment' of services or goods of a
covered accommodation."8 9 If a nexus exists between a challenged
service and a place of public accommodation, a claim may be
actionable even when the challenged service does not prevent
physical access to a public accommodation."o Thus, the Target
court found the discrimination actionable because there was a
nexus between the challenged service, Target.com, and the
plaintiffs' full enjoyment of the services of the public
accommodation, Target's brick-and-mortar stores."
C. How is Target Different?-Reconciling the Split
Target is the first published decision allowing a Title III claim
of website inaccessibility against a private entity to proceed against
a defendant.92 The Ninth Circuit previously declined to expand the
meaning of a "place of public accommodation" beyond the stated
categories noted in Title III-a place of public accommodation is a
"physical place." In Target, the defendant relied on
Stoutenborough, Rendon, and Access Now to argue that a website
was not an actionable place of public accommodation under
Title III.94 Applying this "physical place" approach to Target, the
Ninth Circuit might not have entertained a Title III claim against a
website. However, the Ninth Circuit allowed Title III claims when
there is "unequal access" to a public accommodation's service, if a
plaintiff can prove a nexus between the service and the public
accommodation." Thus, because the Target court did find a nexus
between the services offered by a website and the public
89 Id. at 954.
90 See id. at 953-54.
9' Id. at 955 ("[The] inaccessibility of Target.com denies the blind the ability
to enjoy the services of Target stores.").
92 RoZYCKI & MUNGERSON, supra note 10.
93 Id. at 952 (citing Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th
Cir. 1999); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Assoc. of New
England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994)) ("The Ninth Circuit has
declined to join those circuits which have suggested that a 'place of public
accommodation' may have a more expansive meaning.").
94 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
9 5Id. at 952.
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accommodation with which the website was "heavily integrated,"
the plaintiffs' claim was viable.96
The Target court stated three reasons for how its decision could
be reconciled with the Title III precedents to find a nexus between
Target and Target.com. First, the court found that Target.com's
services were offered by Target, a place of public
accommodation." Second, even though the challenged service did
not prevent physical access to Target stores, inaccessibility to
Target.com did affect equal enjoyment of services offered by
Target.98 Finally, there was a connection between the challenged
service, Target.com, and the Target stores.99
In Stoutenborough, there was no Title III liability because,
although the game the plaintiffs wished to watch was played in a
place of public accommodation, the actual service"oo "[did] not
involve a 'place of public accommodation.""0 ' The broadcast may
have been "offered through the defendants," but "not as a service
of [a] public accommodation." 02 Target tried to argue that, like the
NFL in Stoutenborough, Target.com was a service offered through,
but not by, Target.o3
The Ninth Circuit, however, found that "many of the benefits
and privileges of [Target.com] are services of the Target stores."'"
Unlike the Sixth Circuit in Stoutenborough, where the public
accommodation, a stadium, was not offering the challenged
broadcast, Target stores were offering the services of
Target.com.o' Because the challenged service in Target was
"heavily integrated with the brick-and-mortar stores and operate[d]
1 Id. at 955.
97 Id. at 954.
98 Id. at 953, 955.
99 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
100 The actual service was the actual television broadcast.
'o1 Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.
1995).
102 Id. at 583.
103 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954.10 oId.
'
0 Id. at 954-55.
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in many ways as a gateway to the stores," Target.com was a
service offered by Target.'06
In Rendon, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
challenged service-a telephone screening process-occurring
outside a place of public accommodation could be in violation of
Title III without denying physical access to the accommodation. 0 7
Under Rendon, intangible barriers may diminish the "full and equal
enjoyment" of the services or privileges of a place of public
accommodation, and thus, are a sufficient basis for a claim under
Title III.' In Target, the Ninth Circuit found that, like the
telephone screening process in Rendon, the "inaccessibility of
Target.com denies the blind the ability to enjoy the services of
Target stores."'0
Unlike Stoutenborough and Rendon, Access Now did not
involve a physical place of public accommodation. The Access
Now plaintiffs argued that inaccessibility to a website,
southwest.com, was depriving blind people access to "virtual ticket
counters.""0  The plaintiffs did not demonstrate the website
"impeded" access to a physical location."' Since there was no
potential link to a physical place of public accommodation, the
court did not find a nexus between the challenged services of
106 Id. at 955. In recounting the background of the case, the court also noted:
Target.com is a website owned and operated by Target. By visiting
Target.com, customers can purchase many of the items available in
Target stores. Target.com also allows a customer to perform functions
related to Target stores. For example, through Target.com, a customer
can access information on store locations and hours, refill a
prescription or order photo prints for pick-up at a store, and print
coupons to redeem at a store.
Id. at 949.
107 Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (1lth Cir.
2002).
108 Id. at 1286.
109 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
"o Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321
(S.D. Fla. 2002).
"' Id. ("[B]ecause the Internet website, southwest.com, does not exist in any
particular geographical location, Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that
Southwest's website impedes their access to a specific, physical, concrete space
such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel agency.").
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southwest.com and a Title III "public accommodation." 1 2  In
Target, by contrast, the physical presence of Target stores and the
integration between the stores and Target.com provided grounds
for a nexus, thereby giving the plaintiffs a viable Title III claim.'
The Target court was the first to bring business websites within
the reach of Title III by finding a nexus between Target.com and
Target stores."4  Target, however, is a fact-specific holding,
making it difficult to predict its impact on other cases involving
websites as places of public accommodation. Part IV examines the
implications and scope of the Target decision, concluding that,
after seventeen years, Title III should be amended by Congress to
address websites. By addressing these guidelines now, Congress
will simply be acknowledging the pervasive role of the Internet
and join other nations that have already addressed websites in
comparable statutes."' Furthermore, amending the ADA will
obviate the need for disability advocacy groups and small
businesses to rely on organized litigation to answer the question:
to which websites does Title III apply?
IV. TITLE III AND BUSINESS WEBSITES POST-TARGET
Although the Ninth Circuit has not yet determined whether
Target violated Title III for failure to make Target.com accessible
to the blind, allowing the claim to proceed is significant because it
demonstrates judicial willingness to bring websites within the
jurisdiction of Title 111.116 However, while the Ninth Circuit found
a nexus in Target because of the integrated services of Target.com
112 Id. The Access Now plaintiffs did not allege or prove there was a nexus
between southwest.com and Southwest's physical ticket counters. The plaintiffs
only claimed southwest.com impeded their access to the company's "virtual
ticket counters." See id. ("Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that Southwest's
website impedes their access to a specific, physical, concrete space such as a
particular airline ticket counter or travel agency.").
"' Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55.
114 See ROZYCKI & MUNGERSON, supra note 10.
" See National Council on Disability, When the Americans with Disabilities
Act Goes Online: Application of the ADA to the Internet and the Worldwide
Web (July 10, 2003), http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/
adainternet.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
"' See Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 955-56 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
290 [VOL. 8: 273
SPIUNG 2007] Amending the ADA following Target
and Target stores, it did not state a rule regarding the degree of
integration necessary to find a nexus.
The Target court opened the door for Title III claims related to
business websites by establishing the other end of the spectrum
from the Eleventh Circuit in Access Now, where the court found no
nexus because no public accommodation was involved."' 8  In
defining the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit addressed
only the facts of Target and did not address the potential fact
scenarios that are likely to arise in the area between the spectrum's
endpoints. The "heavily integrated" and "gateway to the stores"
language of Target provides an unformulated standard and will
require other circuits to define points on the continuum between
the endpoints as they address future Title III claims." 9
A. The "Heavily Integrated" Facts of Target
The degree of integration between the services of Target stores
and Target.com was crucial to the Target decision. Target
shoppers have the ability to use Target.com to get information
about locations and hours of operation, order prescription refills,
order photos online, or print coupons to redeem at a store.120
The Ninth Circuit's decision implies that websites of other
major retailers, such as Wal-Mart and K-Mart, may have a
sufficient nexus to brick-and-mortar stores to support Title III
claims.121 It is not unreasonable to anticipate that other circuits
will be willing to adopt an approach similar to the Target court-
finding websites of large retailers have a nexus to the storefronts
and, therefore, are actionable under Title III. However, the
extension of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning to retailers with website
services less integrated to storefronts remains unclear.
"7 Id. at 955 (stating the website in Target's case was "heavily integrated" to
the actual stores, and that it served as a "gateway to the stores").
118 See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312,
1321 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
119 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
120 Id. at 949.
121 This outcome assumes individual courts would be willing to find the same
nexus as the court did in Target.
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B. How Significant Does the Integration Need to Be?
Over the last few years, the evolution of the Internet has
transformed the way many companies do business. 12 2 For example,
numerous businesses operate exclusively online, selling products
from their website and keeping inventory at a warehouse.12 3
Moreover, most traditional retailers also have websites that
supplement their physical presence by offering the same inventory
sold in their physical stores. 24 While it is difficult to predict how
narrowly courts will interpret and apply the Ninth Circuit's
integration standard, if left to judicial discretion, it is possible that
many small businesses with websites will be found to have a nexus
between their storefronts and their websites-opening these
businesses to unanticipated Title III liability.
The Target holding was limited to cases where the website
offers information and services connected to storefronts.125 Based
on the required connection, it seems an online-only retailer would
not be vulnerable to a Title III action against its website.126 Since
the warehouse is not a place of public accommodation falling
within any of the twelve enumerated categories in Title III, the
connection or integration necessary to create a nexus would not
exist.127 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not indicate the degree of
connection or integration necessary for a nexus to exist between a
website and a storefront.128
122 As of 2005, "online retailing" had been in existence for about ten years
with online retail sales reaching $89.0 billion, excluding travel. See National
Retail Federation, Online Retail Sales, Profitability Continue Climb,
SHOP.ORG/FORRESTER RESEARCH, May 24, 2005, http://www.shop.org/press/05/
052405.asp (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
123 Examples include Amazon.com, 1-800-FLOWERS.COM, Drugstore.com,
eBay, Netflix, and Overstock.com.
124 In other words, there are no integration of services between the website and
the brick-and-mortar presence (unlike the situation in Target).
125 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ("To the extent that
Target.com offers information and services unconnected to Target stores, which
do not affect the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Target stores, the
plaintiffs fail[ed] to state a claim under Title III of the ADA.").
126 See id at 954-55.
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
128 Target, 452 F. Supp. at 955.
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While it is clear from Target that heavily integrated services
will meet the nexus requirement, the court implies that any
connection between a store and website that affects the enjoyment
of the goods and services of a store may be sufficient to find a
nexus. There are numerous small businesses with websites
offering similar types of information and benefits that Target.com
offers to its customers. For example, most retailers with websites
provide information regarding store location and hours of
operation. In addition, like Target.com, many retailers offer
coupons through their websites which can be redeemed in stores.
Providing store location and hours of operation through a
website may not constitute information and services affecting the
enjoyment of the goods and services of the actual store. Using
Target as an example, a small retailer that offers coupons to
customers through a website not accessible to the visually impaired
could easily be seen as affecting the enjoyment of the goods and
services of the brick-and-mortar store. Ultimately, the outcome of
Title III's application to small businesses for inaccessible websites
will depend on judicial interpretation of Target.
While the issue has not yet been litigated, the Target plaintiffs
argued that the costs associated with making a website
user-friendly for the blind are "not economically prohibitive.""
Costs of making websites accessible to the blind may be the main
issue for large-scale retailers,13 0 but the costs are only one of the
concerns for small businesses faced with Title III claims. Another
129 Id. at 949.
130 In its Fiscal Year 2007, Target had total revenues of $59.5 billion and
expenses of $54.4 billion. See Press Release, Target Corporation, Target
Corporation Fourth Quarter Earnings Per Share $1.29 (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://investors.target.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65828&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=
967693&highlight- (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). Target reportedly received an estimate of $90,000 for the
necessary alterations to make Target.com fully accessible for disabled people.
See John Grossman, Welcome! No, Not You: American business moves fitfully
toward website accessibility for the disabled, INC.coM, Feb. 2007, http://www.
inc.com/magazine/20070201/features-criterion-508-accessibility.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). This makes the estimated one-time cost of these accessibility
changes less than 0.002% of Target's annual expenses.
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challenge for small businesses is understanding this requirement in
the first place. As the ADA and Title III stand today, there is no
language that provides notice to small business owners that their
websites must be made accessible to the blind. Further, in the
wake of Target, it is not clear how the different circuits will choose
to apply Title III to business websites. However, without the
clarity provided by statutory language, even if circuits aligned
uniformly on the application of Title III to websites, through no
fault of their own, the uninformed, small business person would
face a high risk of litigation for ignorance of the common law.
V. PROVIDING UNIFORM FUTURE TREATMENT BY ADDRESSING
WEBSITES IN TITLE III TODAY
A. Websites as Places ofPublic Accommodation
In order to understand why Congress should act now to amend
Title III to address websites, it is first necessary to examine how
the connection between websites and Title III has been viewed by
the government since the ADA was enacted seventeen years ago.
Evidence from as early as 1996 indicates that, on behalf of
their constituents, senators were communicating with the
Department of Justice regarding website accessibility for the
disabled.131 In 1996, the Internet was in its initial phases of
becoming a commonly-used public resource, so it is
understandable that Congress chose to wait for the Internet to
develop further before conducting an formal inquiry on adding
websites to the language of the ADA.
Congress undertook its first organized inquiry on this issue in
2000.132 During that inquiry, the House Subcommittee on the
13 Letter from the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights to Senator Tom
Harkin, (Sept. 9, 1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/tal712.txt (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
132 Hearing on the Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
to Private Internet Sites Before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Congress (2000) [hereinafter
Hearing], available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju65010.000/hju6500Of.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology).
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Constitution heard testimony from a number of legal and
technology experts on the potential ramifications of extending
Title III to apply to private websites.'" In addition, the hearings
noted that the Department of Justice had already independently
concluded that the ADA applied to private websites.'34 After the
2000 hearing, Congress presumably opted not to add language
addressing websites to the ADA, and has not made another formal
inquiry into the issue over the past seven years.
Access Now and Target demonstrate that the issue of website
inaccessibility for the disabled has remained a topic of interest for
both the general public and the disability advocacy community
since the Congressional hearings in 2000.'" The National Council
on the Disability (NCD) was established as an independent federal
agency in 1998 "to promote policies, programs, practices, and
procedures that guarantee equal opportunity for all individuals with
disabilit[ies]."' 3 6 In 2003, the NCD analyzed whether the ADA
applied to commercial and other private sector websites. 3 7
Ultimately, the NCD concluded that the ADA is applicable to these
websites and that the Department of Justice was in a position to
lead efforts to propose a change.' In December 2006, after
Target, the NCD recommended a number of action items related to
identified technology trends, including "ensur[ing] that access to
13 id.
134 Id. (opening statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady, Chairman, Subcomm.
on the Constitution).
135 The first known complaint regarding website accessibility was when
National Federation of the Blind brought suit against America Online in 1999.
See Lex Frieden, National Council on Disability, When the Americans with
Disabilities Act Goes Online: Application of the ADA to the Internet and the
Worldwide Web (2003), http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/
adaintemet.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). Ultimately, the complaint was voluntarily
dismissed, and the parties entered into an agreement.
136 29 U.S.C. § 780(a)(2)(A) (2006).
137 See Frieden, supra note 135.
138 id.
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the Internet and other virtual environments is provided, as it has
been to physical places of public accommodation.""'
The ten-year documented history of interest in website
accessibility under the ADA and the evidence that litigation
regarding website accessibility for the disabled continues to gain
momentum indicate that this issue is not one likely to dissipate
with time. Rather, it must again be formally reviewed by
Congress.
B. Why Now? Why Congress?
Recommendations by the NCD since the 2000 hearings, as well
as recent activity in the courts related to website accessibility for
the disabled,'40 support a call for Congress to consider
incorporating language addressing websites into Title III.
Examining why Congress did not take action to incorporate
websites into the "places of public accommodation" list in 2000
makes clear why taking such action now is appropriate. First, the
2000 hearings occurred towards the end of the dot-com boom.
There was a feeling, as evidenced by some of the testimony at the
hearings, that placing accessibility standards on websites would
hinder the continuing growth of e-commerce and the proliferation
of the Internet which was already waning.14 ' In addition, while not
clear from testimony, Congress may have been wary of the future
of the Internet as signs of a downturn in the dot-coin market started
to appear. Perhaps Congress believed e-commerce might not
recover from severe market fallout, and the Internet would return
to pre-boom popularity levels-no longer a formidable commerce
engine worthy of Title III consideration. While Congress opted
not to add language to the Title III after the 2000 hearings, this
139 JOHN VAUGHN, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, OVER THE HORIZON:
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF EMERGING TRENDS IN INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY ON DISABILITY POLICY AND PRACTICE 41 (Dec.
19, 2006), http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2006/pdf/emerging
trends.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
140 See Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Access Now, Inc. v.
Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
141 Hearing, supra note 132 (statement of Dr. Steven Lucas, Chief
Information Officer and Senior Vice President, Privaseek, Inc.).
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decision should not be seen as the final word of Congress on the
importance of website accessibility as it relates to Title III, as
much has changed since 2000.
The time is right for Congress to add language addressing
websites to Title III for several reasons. First, as it relates to the
lifetime of the Internet, a substantial amount of time has passed
since the 2000 hearings. The continued growth of e-commerce and
the proliferation of the Internet are not in doubt now as they were
in 2000. Second, the issue of website accessibility for the disabled
has become an organized movement with disability advocacy
groups, and, as a result, it is an issue courts will repeatedly address
in the near-term. Finally, as litigation in the area of Title III claims
related to websites continues, it is the optimal time for Congress to
provide small business owners with a statutory answer for whether
their websites need to be ADA compliant. While the Target
decision defined one end of the spectrum for applying Title III to
business websites, the spectrum does not provide small business
owners with sufficient notice as to how or whether their websites
must be changed, if at all. Moreover, small business owners do not
have the legal resources of a multi-billion dollar corporation to
advise them on how to comply with the unclear Target standard in
order to avoid Title III liability. By waiting for the Supreme Court
to address and possibly clarify the Target-Access Now spectrum,
Congress is exposing otherwise ADA-compliant businesses to
costly and unnecessary litigation.
C. Proposed Language Changes
There are three primary ways Congress can alter the language
of Title III to address websites. First, exclusionary language could
be added to the end of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) stating: websites are
not considered public accommodations for purposes of Title III. In
the alternative, Congress could add language allowing application
of Title III to websites having specific relationships or affiliations
with a place of public accommodation.'4 2 Finally, language could
142 Congress could also choose to find that all private websites are subject to
Title III as places of public accommodation. However, if Congress chooses to
have 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) apply to all private websites (commercial websites
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be added to bring all business websites within the meaning of a
Title III place of public accommodation, regardless of an affiliation
with a physical space.
If Congress reviews this issue and again decides to exclude
websites from Title III, exclusionary language should be added to
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). However, if Congress adopts a language
change to address websites that have a connection with a place of
public accommodation, the language addition will require more
explicit guidelines to avoid merely replicating the existing
spectrum.
First, certain large e-commerce retailers, like Amazon.com, are
not currently affiliated with a place of public accommodation, and,
thus, do not share a nexus with a public accommodation which
would require Title III compliance. However, to enable
e-commerce-only retailers to be free of Title III compliance
because they do not have a physical presence gives them a
competitive advantage in cyberspace over retailers that do.143 More
importantly, it deprives the disabled from taking advantage of the
and personal websites), then it could be overstepping the authority to enforce
and enact the ADA through the Commerce Clause because many private
websites are not related to commerce in any way. See Goldfarb, supra note 68,
at 1335 (stating that many non-retail and non-commercial websites that are
either personal in nature or merely provide information would probably not
satisfy the necessary relationship to interstate commerce).
143 Websites like Amazon.com do have agreements with retailers to provide
the front-end of the virtual stores of these retailers. See Martin Wolk, Toys 'R'
Us wins suit against Amazon.com, MSNBC.CoM, Mar. 2, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11641703/ (discussing Amazon.com's "brick-
and-click" partnerships with retailers) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology). While the storefronts of these retailers would qualify as
public accommodations, Amazon.com only provides front-end, online access to
the goods of the retailers. Unlike Target's relationship with Target.com,
Amazon.com is a service offered through the retailers, not by the retailers. See
Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (comparing the Target.com
and Target connection to the NFL connection with the television broadcast in
Stoutenborough v. Nat'1 Football League, Inc.). Thus, because Amazon.com is
not offering its own goods and services in connection with its own public
accommodation, the connection with a public accommodation for purposes of
Title III liability does not exist. See, e.g., Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football
League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995).
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goods or services of these e-commerce-only retailers. In
expanding the language of Title III to address websites affiliated
with certain places of public accommodation, language must also
be added to ensure that website-only businesses, such as retailers,
schools, or pharmacies, are effectively considered places of public
accommodation by the nature of their interaction with the public as
one of the already enumerated entities included in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7).
Second, Congress should include language addressing the
post-Target issue of the degree of connection needed between a
public accommodation and a website to establish a nexus, and thus,
subjecting the website to Title III. By adding language to
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), Congress could take the opportunity to
redefine what constitutes the currently judicially-defined nexus to
include any website that is affiliated with or sponsored by a place
of public accommodation as defined by the statute. This would
eliminate the need to examine what offerings are on a website, and
how those offerings are connected to the public accommodations
before determining if the website must be Title III compliant. In
addition, there would no longer be a post-Target grey area and
small businesses would be provided with a clear rule to follow
when establishing a website affiliated with the business.
If Congress chooses to offer a blanket application of Title III to
websites merely affiliated with places of public accommodation, it
could adopt language putting Title III closer to the Target
"connection" standard. For example, a standard that would find a
sufficient nexus with a place of public accommodation where a
website offers some degree of direct shopping capabilities or
coupons for use at the physical store. This standard would require
setting out clear percentages as to how much of a retailer's
products or services must be made available online for the website
to be considered sufficiently connected to a public accommodation
for Title III to apply. In the alternative, the standard could be
based on the percentage of a company's sales generated through its
website. Additionally, Congress should clarify whether retailers
that offer only items such as coupons through a website, and opt
not to sell goods online, would be considered connected enough
with a public accommodation for purposes of Title III.
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The effect of this approach is likely to require far fewer
websites to be compliant with Title III than the affiliation or
sponsorship by a public accommodation standard. Using a
percentage of products, services, or sales standard enables a
business to offer just under the requisite percentage of goods
online or limit online sales in order to avoid the Title III
compliance requirement. Unless the percentage hurdle is very
low,'" many businesses may simply opt to alter the amount of
products offered through the website so that the website falls just
under the hurdle for Title III compliance. The percentage standard
lends itself to more manipulation by businesses, whereas the
affiliation or sponsorship standard forces businesses to consider the
inherent value of a website to their customer relationships and
revenue generation. Further enabling businesses to manipulate
their need to comply with Title III runs counter to the spirit of the
ADA.
Finally, if Congress wishes to have Title III include all
websites affiliated with a business in any way, it can add business
websites to the list of places of public accommodation. This would
avoid the confusion inherent in requiring a certain type of
affiliation with one of the already defined places of public
accommodation. Applying Title III to all business websites will
impose additional costs upon even more businesses than the
preceding proposal and, for that reason, may face more challenges
from businesses. However, this would provide a standard that will
be easier to apply and is consistent with the purpose of the ADA.
In adding language to Title III to address websites, Congress
should give either a blanket exclusion to all websites or require all
business websites to comply with Title III, including e-commerce-
only retailers. Either approach has the ability to provide a far
clearer standard than presently exists. However, applying Title III
to business websites is the option that best embraces the purpose of
the ADA and brings Title III into the twenty-first century.
'" For example, five to ten percent of total products or services offered by the
business could be a low enough hurdle such that no business currently offering a
substantial amount of products through its website would be willing to
manipulate its online product offerings down to the level necessary to avoid
having to make its website Title III compliant.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment, courts have interpreted Title III to cover
services having a nexus to a place of public accommodation.'4 5 If a
service prevents disabled individuals from taking advantage of the
privileges or equal enjoyment of the place of public
accommodation, then there is a nexus. The nexus standard has
enabled courts to apply Title III to services clearly linked to a
statutory "public accommodation,"'46 even though the challenged
services are not directly offered by the public accommodation.14
Prior to Target, no court had allowed an inaccessibility claim
against a business's website under Title III.148 However, the Ninth
Circuit found that the connection between Target's website and
stores comprised a nexus necessary for a Title III claim.'49
Although the court's decision was based on a very specific set of
facts, the Target decision had the effect of creating a nexus-
spectrum for Title III lawsuits involving websites. On one end of
the spectrum is the Ninth Circuit stating a website with heavily-
integrated services connected to the equal enjoyment of services of
a place of public accommodation creates a nexus and viable
Title III claim against a website."' On the other end of the
spectrum is the Eleventh Circuit's assertion that if there is no place
of public accommodation, there is no nexus, and a Title III claim
against the website is not viable.'"' By not stating the minimum
connection or integration required to find the necessary nexus
between a website and public accommodation for Title III to apply,
145 See, e.g., Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.
2002); Stoutenborough v. Nat'1 Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.
1995). But see Kolling v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 318 F.3d 715 (6th Cir.
2003); Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D.
Fla. 2002).
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
147 See, e.g., Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.
2002). But see Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583
(6th Cir. 1995).
148 ROZYCKI & MUNGERSON, supra note 10.
149 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
'' Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321
(S.D. Fla. 2002).
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Target provides an unclear standard in a time when Title III
litigation against websites appears to be gaining momentum.
In an effort to avoid the confusion that businesses and other
Title III places of public accommodation may face in the wake of
Target, Congress should amend the language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7) to address the issue of websites as places of public
accommodation. Although Congress addressed this issue in 2000,
the Internet has continued to evolve since that time, and the
increased growth in website related Title III claims puts a number
of small businesses at risk for litigation because there is no clear
rule. By adding language to Title III to exclude websites
explicitly, to broaden its application to e-commerce-only retailers
and websites affiliated with a place of public accommodation, or to
apply to all business websites, Congress will provide a clear
answer to the question remaining after Target: to which websites
does Title III apply?
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